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TOPPS GETS EXCLUSIVE LICENSE,
LEAVING UPPER DECK ON THE
BENCH: AN ANALYSIS OF MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST
EXEMPTION IN THE MODERN ERA
I. INTRODUCTION
Baseball is “America’s pastime.” Like most things with such a long
history, the game has certainly seen its fair share of minor changes, but the
basic rules have remained largely unchanged. Simply put, it is still “three
strikes, and you’re out!”
Major League Baseball’s (MLB or Major League) antitrust exemption has
a similarly long and steady history. Since its inception in 1922, 1 the MLB
antitrust exemption has been challenged numerous times. Just as the rules of
the game have slightly changed throughout its history while still remaining
pretty much the same, so too has the exemption been slightly altered,
specifically through Congress’ enactment of the Curt Flood Act. 2 However,
the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed the existence of the
exemption and has seemingly left it to Congress to narrow the exemption’s
scope. 3 Thus, as it stands today, MLB still retains its broad exemption from
the federal antitrust laws.
In 2009, MLB entered into a licensing agreement with the Topps baseball
card company, granting the company exclusive rights to the use of MLB
trademarks on baseball cards. 4 Thus, Upper Deck, a former Major League
Baseball Properties’ (MLBP) licensee, was no longer able to legally use these
marks. 5 Similar MLB licensing deals have been challenged in the past, 6 but

1. See generally Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259
U.S. 200 (1922).
2. See Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 26b(a) (2011).
3. See generally Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953); see also Flood v. Kuhn,
407 U.S. 258 (1972).
4. Tom Singer, MLB Announces Exclusive Deal with Topps: Move Designed to Streamline,
Stimulate Trading-Card Market, MLB.COM (Aug. 6, 2009), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd
=20090806&content_id=6276188&vkey=news_mlb&fext=.jsp&c_id=mlb.
5. MLB Props., Inc. v. The Upper Deck Co., No.10 Civ. 732, *3–5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010),
available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york /nysdce/1:2010cv00732/
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the antitrust exemption has not been scrutinized in this particular context. In
light of the National Football League’s (NFL) recent unsuccessful attempt to
employ the single-entity defense in a similar licensing context in American
Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, 7 some commentators argued that the
licensing deal with Topps represented a unique opportunity for a challenge to
MLB’s antitrust exemption. 8 Although Upper Deck did not bring such a
challenge, this Comment uses this licensing deal as a basis for analyzing the
exemption in the modern era.
Part II of this Comment provides a history of MLB’s antitrust exemption
and its challenges and explains that the heart of modern challenges to the
exemption relate to the nature and extent of its scope. Part III describes the
American Needle case and the single-entity argument employed by the NFL.
Part IV discusses MLB’s exclusive license deal with Topps and why Upper
Deck may have missed an opportunity to challenge MLB’s antitrust exemption
in light of American Needle. This section also asserts that were the exemption
challenged in the intellectual property and licensing contexts, MLB could use
many of the NFL’s failed single-entity arguments to explain how its actions
are covered under the scope of MLB’s exemption as it exists today.
II. HISTORY OF MLB’S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
To fully appreciate the breadth of MLB’s antitrust exemption, it is first
necessary to examine its origins and history. Typically, the Sherman Act, a
federal antitrust law, serves as one of the primary ways to regulate MLB and
other professional sports. However, MLB is almost entirely exempt from the
purview of the Sherman Act. This exemption stems from a trio of Supreme
Court cases that form the “Baseball Trilogy,” as well as a long history of lower
court judicial decisions and legislative actions.
A. Sherman Act
One fundamental economic principle is that a free, open, and competitive
market should generally result in a market that is the most beneficial for all

357850/28/.
6. See, e.g., MLB Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2008).
7. See generally 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010).
8. See J. Gordon Hylton, Does Baseball’s Antitrust Immunity Extend to Baseball Card
Contracts?, MARQ. UNIV. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG (Aug. 14, 2009), http://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/
2009/08/14/does-baseballs-antitrust-immunity-extend-to-baseball-card-contracts/; see also Matt
Straquadine, Baseball Card Contract Raises Antitrust Concerns, THE AM L. DAILY (Aug. 10, 2009),
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/ 2009/08/topps-baseball-cards.html.
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Specifically, when competitive forces govern the
parties involved. 9
availability and price of a given product in a competitive market, it should
“yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the
highest quality and the greatest material progress . . . .” 10 With these concepts
in mind, as well as a growing concern regarding anticompetitive activity from
dominant firms, Congress enacted the Sherman Act in 1890 11 “to preserve a
competitive marketplace and protect consumer welfare.” 12
Section One of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract,
combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States . . . .” 13 The focus of Section One is on agreements between
two or more competitors that unreasonably restrain trade. In order to
demonstrate a violation of Section One, the plaintiff must show evidence of
“(1) concerted action that (2) unreasonably restrains (3) interstate
commerce.” 14
To determine whether a given restraint is one that unreasonably restrains
trade, courts take one of two approaches. A rule of reason analysis consists of
an in-depth, multi-step burden-shifting test. 15 The plaintiff must show the
anticompetitive effects of a given restraint. 16 If successful, the burden shifts
to the defendant to proffer procompetitive justifications for the restraint. 17
Finally, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that notwithstanding
these procompetitive justifications, the same objectives could have been
achieved through less restrictive means. 18 The other approach, the per se
analysis, condemns the challenged practices as unreasonable restraints of trade
without any elaborate inquiries into the particular circumstances because of
their facially clear anticompetitive effect. 19 Typically, actions of professional
sports leagues are analyzed under the rule of reason approach because the
Supreme Court has recognized that the sports industry is one “in which
horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be
9. ROBERT PITOFSKY ET AL., TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1, 2 (6th ed. 2010).
10. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
11. PITOFSKY, supra note 9, at 1.
12. MATTHEW MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
PROBLEMS 421 (2d ed. 2009).
13. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2011).
14. Brittany Van Roo, One Trilogy That Should Go Without a Sequel: Why the Baseball Antitrust
Exemption Should Be Repealed, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 381, 383 (2010).
15. See Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 405–06.
19. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984).
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available at all,” 20 and these restraints may actually enhance competition. 21
B. The “Baseball Trilogy”
Generally, the Sherman Act represents “one of the primary bodies of
public law used to regulate professional sports.” 22 For the most part, MLB
has been entirely exempt from the purview of the antitrust laws. The history
of this exemption can be traced through three primary Supreme Court cases,
known as the “Baseball Trilogy.” 23
MLB’s antitrust exemption was judicially created in 1922 in Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had conspired to
Clubs. 24
monopolize the business of baseball by buying or inducing the Federal League
clubs to leave their league. 25 In this landmark decision, the Supreme Court
held that MLB was not subject to the antitrust laws because it was not engaged
in interstate commerce. 26 In his oft-quoted line, Justice Holmes famously
stated, “[t]he business is giving exhibitions of base ball, which are purely state
affairs.” 27
More than thirty years later, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to
revisit the exemption. In Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 28 the Court
noted that “[t]he business has thus been left for thirty years to develop, on the
understanding that it was not subject to existing antitrust legislation,” and that
if the exemption was to be repealed, it was a task for Congress rather than the
judiciary. 29 Thus, the Court affirmed the exemption.
Finally, in 1972, faced again with a challenge to MLB’s reserve system,
the Court in Flood v. Kuhn 30 reaffirmed baseball’s exemption from the
Sherman Act’s regulatory scheme. 31 The Court recognized that the exemption
is an anomaly because “[p]rofessional baseball is a business and it is engaged

20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 101.
Id. at 102.
MITTEN, supra note 12, at 421.
PETER A. CARFAGNA, SPORTS AND THE LAW: EXAMINING THE LEGAL EVOLUTION OF
AMERICA’S THREE “MAJOR LEAGUES” 34 (2009).
24. See generally 259 U.S. 200.
25. Id. at 207–08.
26. Id. at 208.
27. Id.
28. See generally 346 U.S. 356.
29. Id. at 357.
30. See generally 407 U.S. 258.
31. Id. at 285.
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in interstate commerce,” 32 but noted the long history of the exemption and that
“there is merit in consistency even though some might claim that beneath that
consistency is a layer of inconsistency.” 33 As in Toolson, the Court again
insisted that any inconsistency should be remedied legislatively rather than by
the Court, given Congress’ “positive inaction” allowing the decision to stand
for so long. 34
C. Lower Court and Legislative Challenges
Following Flood, the actions of both the courts and Congress demonstrate
the continued intent to retain what is typically understood to be an exemption
that is broad in scope. 35 Through the years, the MLB exemption has faced
numerous challenges. Though some construe the exemption as applicable to a
broader range of activities than others, the decisions of the lower courts are
evidence of a general reluctance to narrow MLB’s broad antitrust exemption.
1. Lower Court Challenges
Antitrust suits against MLB have been brought under a variety of different
situations, with these suits generally arising in cases regarding MLB’s reserve
clause 36 or regarding issues of franchise relocation. 37 Some courts, such as
the one in Portland Baseball Club, Inc. v. Baltimore Baseball Club, Inc., 38
have taken the same course of action as the Supreme Court did in Toolson, and
simply acknowledged the existence of the exemption and the fact that it is an
anomaly. Following stare decisis, these courts leave it to Congress to take any
action regarding the exemption. 39 Other courts have taken more in-depth
approaches.
For instance, in Gardella v. Chandler, 40 an antitrust suit regarding a
challenge to MLB’s reserve clause taking place in 1949, before Toolson and
well before Flood, the Second Circuit refused to blindly follow the reasoning
set out in Federal Baseball. 41 Although the court agreed with the general
32.
33.
34.
35.
§ 26b.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 282.
Id. at 284.
Id. at 283–84.
See, e.g., Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978); see also 15 U.S.C.
See, e.g., Flood, 407 U.S. 258.
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1966).
See generally 282 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1960).
Id. at 680.
See generally 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
See generally id.
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holding in Federal Baseball, it focused on substantial advances in technology
since the time of that landmark decision in 1922. 42 Specifically, the Gardella
court felt that the exemption was simply inapplicable due to the rise of radio
and television that changed what was once a purely intrastate affair into a
clearly interstate affair. 43 Thus, the court remanded the case back to the lower
court to decide the issues under the Sherman Act. 44 After Gardella, the
Supreme Court acknowledged this same shift of baseball from an intrastate to
an obviously interstate affair, making the exemption an anomaly, but the Court
has yet to take the next step and allow for analysis under the Sherman Act.
Instead, the Court has left it to Congress to decide to take action regarding the
exemption. 45
In an early franchise-relocation case, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
took a vastly different approach to that taken in Gardella. 46 Following the
announcement of the Milwaukee Braves’ relocation to Atlanta and the
subsequent decline in team performance and attendance, the State of
Wisconsin brought an antitrust suit against the Milwaukee Braves under state
antitrust laws. 47 Unlike the suit in Gardella, which took place before Toolson,
this suit was filed shortly after Toolson. Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s
lead, the Wisconsin Supreme Court deferred to Congress to alter the
exemption, and thus did not allow the plaintiff to circumvent the exemption
through the use of state antitrust laws. 48
Although Flood reaffirmed the continued existence of MLB’s
exemption, 49 in the opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court referred only to the MLB
reserve system. 50 Thus, judicial challenges following Flood have not been
concerned with the exemption’s existence. Instead, the modern focus is on the
scope of the exemption, with plaintiffs often arguing that, based on Flood, the
exemption only applies to the reserve system and not to any other aspects of
the business of baseball. 51 As the Supreme Court has been silent on the issue
of the MLB exemption since Flood in 1972, the question of its scope has an
extensive history of its own and is an ongoing battle.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 411.
Id.
Id. at 415.
See generally Flood, 407 U.S. 258.
See generally Milwaukee Braves, 144 N.W.2d 1.
See generally id.
Id. at 18.
See generally Flood, 407 U.S. 258.
Id. at 259, 282.
See Finley, 569 F.2d at 540.
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For instance, in Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass’n, 52
the Southern District of Texas took a narrow view of MLB’s exemption. 53 In
this case, the defendant cancelled the plaintiff’s contract to broadcast Houston
Astros games. 54 The plaintiff alleged that horizontal restraints were imposed
on the greater Houston radio market through various anticompetitive acts of
the defendant relating to the cancellation of the broadcasting contract. 55
Relying on Gardella and Flood, the court framed the issue as whether “radio
broadcasting is so much a part of baseball that it, as well as baseball, is exempt
from the antitrust laws.” 56 In denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss based
on the MLB antitrust exemption, the court stated, “[t]he issue in the case is not
baseball but a distinct and separate industry, broadcasting . . . . The reserve
clause and other ‘unique characteristics and needs’ of the game have no
bearing at all on the questions presented.” 57
Similarly, in holding that no preemption of state antitrust laws existed due
to MLB’s federal antitrust exemption, the Southern District of New York in
Postema v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs 58 determined that,
like broadcasting, relationships with non-players were not unique
characteristics or needs of the game deserving of an exemption from the
federal antitrust laws. 59 Specifically, “[a]nti-competitive conduct toward
umpires is not an essential part of baseball and in no way enhances its vitality
or viability.” 60
Arguably, the most unique lower court decision is a case regarding a
franchise relocation decision, Piazza v. Major League Baseball. 61 In Piazza,
the plaintiffs claimed federal antitrust violations regarding MLB’s alleged
efforts to prevent the plaintiffs from purchasing the San Francisco Giants and
relocating the franchise to Tampa, Florida. 62 The court undertook a
comprehensive stare decisis analysis and concluded that many courts
improperly applied the doctrine of stare decisis by focusing purely on the

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See generally 541 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
See generally id.
Id. at 264.
Id.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 271.
See generally 799 F. Supp. 1475 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
Id. at 1489.
Id.
See generally 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
Id. at 421.
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result in Flood rather than focusing on its reasoning. 63 Following this
reasoning, the defendant’s arguments were dismissed, as the court held that the
concept of stare decisis, when properly applied, required an extremely narrow
view of MLB’s exemption, limited purely to the reserve clause, the
“reasoning” within the stare decisis analysis. 64 Finding this interesting and
unique standard to be the correct form of analysis, some other lower courts
followed suit. 65
However, even the judge in Piazza recognized that other lower courts had
refused to follow such a narrow reading of Flood, and, thus, undertook an
alternative analysis under the assumption that the exemption extended beyond
the reserve clause. 66 The Eastern District of Pennsylvania addressed the
question of whether the market for ownership interests in baseball franchises
was central to the unique characteristics and needs of baseball exhibitions. 67
Although the court would have refused to grant the defendant’s motion to
dismiss based on the exemption under this reasoning as well, it did recognize
that franchise relocation decisions could potentially relate to matters of league
structure, an area generally considered to be a unique characteristic and need
of the game. 68 Regardless, many lower courts reference Piazza for the
aforementioned, very narrow stare decisis reasoning rather than for this
alternative analysis. 69
But, many lower courts have refused to frame the scope of MLB’s
antitrust exemption in such a narrow light. For instance, in Charles O. Finley
& Co. v. Kuhn, 70 a case exemplifying a broad interpretation of the
exemption’s scope, the Seventh Circuit looked to the “Baseball Trilogy” for
guidance and found it clear from those cases that the entire “business of
baseball” is exempt from the federal antitrust laws. 71 The Finley court, like
the courts in favor of a narrow scope for the exemption, noted the specific
references to the reserve clause scattered throughout the reasoning in Flood. 72
However, unlike those courts that concluded that these references supported a

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 438.
Id.
See, e.g., Butterworth v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1994).
Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 438–39.
Id. at 440.
Id. at 441.
See, e.g., Butterworth, 644 So. 2d at 1023–24.
See generally 569 F.2d 527.
Id. at 541.
Id. at 540–41.
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narrow scope, 73 the court explained that the Supreme Court decisions
indicated an overall intent “to exempt the business of baseball . . . [and not
merely a] particular facet of that business, from the federal antitrust laws.” 74
Regardless of the persuasiveness of Piazza, many lower courts have
chosen to follow the reasoning in Finley and have employed a broad
interpretation of the scope of MLB’s exemption. 75 For instance, the courts in
New Orleans Pelicans Baseball, Inc. v. National Ass’n of Professional
Baseball Leagues, 76 McCoy v. Major League Baseball, 77 and Minnesota
Twins Partnership v. Minnesota 78 all denounced the reasoning in Piazza, with
one court describing it as going against the “great weight of authority” that
recognizes the scope of the exemption as the “business of baseball.” 79 In
Minnesota Twins Partnership, the Minnesota Supreme Court further explained
that the court in Piazza simply tried to make sense of the anomaly but in the
process chose to ignore the key concept in Flood. 80 That is, “the Supreme
Court [in its reaffirmation of the exemption,] had no intention of overruling
Federal Baseball or Toolson despite acknowledging that professional baseball
involves interstate commerce.” 81 As one lower court stated, the “Supreme
Court should retain the exclusive privilege of overruling its own decisions.” 82
Similarly, Major League Baseball v. Butterworth 83 is a case involving
franchise contraction where MLB had announced a decision to contract two
clubs, from thirty to twenty-eight. 84 Applying the standard of determining
whether the challenged action was part of the “business of baseball,” the
Northern District of Florida held that contraction is included as part of the
exempt actions under the business as a whole. 85 The court explained that “[i]t
is difficult to conceive of a decision more integral to the business of major

73. See, e.g., Piazza, 831 F. Supp. 420.
74. Finley, 569 F.2d at 541.
75. See, e.g., New Orleans Pelicans Baseball, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Prof’l Baseball Leagues, No.
93-253, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21468 (E.D. La. 1994).
76. See generally id.
77. See generally 911 F. Supp. 454 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
78. See generally 592 N.W.2d 847 (Minn. 1999).
79. See, e.g., McCoy, 911 F. Supp. at 457.
80. Minn. Twins P’ship, 592 N.W.2d at 855–56.
81. Id. at 856.
82. McCoy, 911 F. Supp. at 457 (quoting Salerno v. Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 429
F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d Cir. 1970)).
83. See generally 181 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (N.D. Fla. 2001).
84. Id. at 1318.
85. Id. at 1331–32.
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league baseball than the number of clubs that will be allowed to compete.” 86
The court again noted that the Supreme Court explicitly declined to overrule
Federal Baseball and that Flood, in light of the obvious anomaly of the
continued existence of the exemption, “was a ruling not about whether the
antitrust exemption should be terminated but about who should make that
decision.” 87 As explained before, the intent expressed in Flood is that this
change should be congressional, rather than judicial, in nature.
2. The Curt Flood Act
As far as any “significant” congressional action regarding the MLB
exemption, only one important action has occurred. In 1998, Congress
enacted the Curt Flood Act, which specifically directs that MLB is now
subject to the antitrust laws for acts “affecting employment of major league
baseball players to play baseball at the major league level . . . to the same
extent such conduct, acts, practices, or agreements would be subject to the
antitrust laws” in other professional sports. 88 That is, MLB players have the
same rights as players in other professional sports to sue regarding
employment terms.
Although this statute technically narrowed MLB’s broad exemption to a
certain extent, in reality, the Curt Flood Act has little actual effect due to the
statutory and nonstatutory labor exemptions. 89 These exemptions effectively
work together to immunize the other professional sports leagues from antitrust
liability for actions that occur as part of the collective bargaining process
between the multiemployer bargaining units and the players’ associations. 90
Given the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the collective bargaining
process, 91 players’ associations must decertify before seeking any antitrust
remedies. 92 Thus, although the Curt Flood Act technically narrows MLB’s
broad antitrust exemption and opens MLB up to antitrust liability for labor and
employment issues, the risk of liability is minimal.
Significantly, Congress could have narrowed the scope of MLB’s antitrust
exemption even more; however, as evidenced by the Curt Flood Act’s narrow
reach, it chose not to do so. 93 Instead, Congress expressed its intent that the
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 1332.
Id. at 1331.
15 U.S.C. § 26b(a).
See MITTEN, supra note 12, at 436–80.
Id. at 437, 470–71.
Id. at 470; see generally Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
MITTEN, supra note 12, at 470–71.
See 15 U.S.C. § 26b.
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exemption should continue to apply to other components of the business of
baseball. 94 For example, the Curt Flood Act does not provide Minor League
Baseball (MiLB or Minor League) players with any antitrust remedies, and,
likewise, it does not apply to any other component of MiLB. 95 Similarly, the
statute explicitly excludes
acts . . . or agreements . . . relating to or affecting franchise
expansion, location or relocation, . . . ownership issues, . . .
[and] the marketing or sales of the entertainment product of
organized professional baseball and the licensing of
intellectual property rights owned or held by organized
professional baseball teams individually or collectively. 96
Thus, the Curt Flood Act would not apply to the actions of MLBP in
granting an exclusive license to Topps for the use of MLB intellectual
property on baseball cards.
Given the “Baseball Trilogy,” combined with the many lower-court
interpretations and the explicit language in the Curt Flood Act, it is clear that
the MLB exemption should be considered broad in scope and apply to more
than the reserve clause.
III. AMERICAN NEEDLE
Notwithstanding this fairly clear intent, in light of the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in American Needle, some have urged that the licensing issue
with Upper Deck may have been a unique opportunity to bring yet another
challenge to MLB’s broad exemption. 97 Although the NFL does not benefit
from an antitrust exemption, the comparison between the Upper Deck situation
and that in American Needle makes sense for at least two reasons. First, the
factual circumstances in each case are substantially similar. Second, the NFL
and NFL Properties (NFLP) relied on the single-entity defense throughout the
American Needle litigation. 98 Many of the arguments and justifications
proffered in support of this single-entity defense would likely be very similar
to those MLB would employ if arguing in support of the inclusion of
intellectual property and licensing agreements in the broad scope of MLB’s
antitrust exemption.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

15 U.S.C. § 26b(b)–(d).
15 U.S.C. § 26b(b)(1).
15 U.S.C. § 26b(3) (emphasis added).
See Hylton, supra note 8; see also Straquadine, supra note 8.
See generally Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. 2201.
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The American Needle case arose when NFLP altered its long practice of
granting nonexclusive licenses for use of the NFL’s intellectual property to
vendors. 99 American Needle had previously received such nonexclusive
licenses for use on headwear but was no longer able to make and sell items
containing the NFL trademarks after NFLP granted Reebok an exclusive tenyear license. 100 American Needle then sued, alleging violations of the
Sherman Act. 101 In response, the NFL argued that it was a single-entity
immune from scrutiny under the Sherman Act. 102
The single-entity defense refers to situations where Section One violations
are alleged, but defendants claim that they are not capable of engaging in a
“‘contract, combination . . . or conspiracy’” because they are actually a single
enterprise acting for the sole benefit of an overarching corporation. 103 For
instance, in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 the Supreme
Court concluded that a corporation “and its wholly owned subsidiary . . . are
incapable of conspiring with one another for purposes of [Section One] of the
Sherman Act” 105 because of the functional relationship between the parent
corporation, as the sole source of economic power, and its wholly owned
subsidiary’s “complete unity of interest.” 106 This relationship is distinguished
from a pure joint venture where there are multiple parent corporations acting
together for a specific purpose that remain distinct and separate entities subject
to Section One scrutiny. 107
Using the reasoning from Copperweld, the NFL urged that it was a singleentity in regard to the licensing of intellectual property by NFLP. 108 The
Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment, concluding that with
regard to “‘the facet of their operations respecting exploitation of intellectual
property rights, the NFL and its [thirty-two] teams . . . have so integrated their
operations that they should be deemed a single entity rather than joint ventures
cooperating for a common purpose.’” 109 Although acknowledging that there
99. Id. at 2207.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984) (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 1).
104. See generally id.
105. Id. at 777.
106. Id. at 771.
107. See Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to Reshape Sports Law,
119 YALE L.J. 726, 737–38, 743–44 (2010).
108. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2207.
109. Id. (quoting Am. Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans La. Saints, 496 F. Supp. 2d 941, 943 (N.D.
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may be aspects of NFL operations that should be classified as a joint venture,
limiting its analysis to the licensing of teams’ intellectual property through
NFLP, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the
NFL was acting as a single-entity in this context. 110 In a somewhat bizarre
twist, with support from other professional sports such as the National
Basketball Association and National Hockey League in the form of amicus
briefs, the NFL supported the plaintiff’s petition for certiorari in the hopes that
the Supreme Court would affirm the NFL’s single-entity status, and, therefore,
provide the NFL and other professional sports organizations with increased
protection from antitrust liability. 111
In its brief before the Supreme Court, the NFL provided justifications for
the single-entity application in this licensing context, both echoing the lower
courts’ reasoning and expanding on it. 112 Specifically, the NFL’s argument at
its most basic level was that “each club’s economic value derives from its
membership in the NFL and its role in the production of NFL Football.” 113
Intellectual property of the NFL and its clubs is integral to this collective
production of NFL football, as “the competition on the field features the clubs’
names, the logos that adorn the players’ uniforms, the uniform designs, and
each club’s official colors.” 114
The NFL explained further that “[t]he clubs’ intellectual property derives
its value from the production of NFL football. Consumers buy hats, shirts,
and other goods bearing club marks . . . not because those symbols have
intrinsic value or independent appeal, but rather because they represent
affiliation with an NFL team.” 115 Recognizing this economic reality, the NFL
formed NFLP to serve as a centralized outlet for managing and marketing the
NFL’s intellectual property. 116 According to the NFL, NFLP serves as the
“‘single driver’ of the teams’ ‘promotional vehicle,’ ‘“pursuing the common
interests of the whole.”‘“ 117
Unfortunately for the NFL and many other professional sports leagues, the
Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decisions on the sole issue of
“whether the alleged activity by the NFL respondents ‘must be viewed as that
Ill. 2007)).
110. Id.
111. McCann, supra note 107, at 735.
112. See generally Brief for Appellee-Respondent, Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201
(2010).
113. Id. at **14.
114. Id. at **15.
115. Id.
116. Id. at **16 (citation omitted).
117. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2213 (citing Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 770).
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of a single enterprise for purposes of [Section One]’” applicability. 118 The
Court held that the centralized activities and control regarding NFL
intellectual property and licensing through the NFLP were not those of a
single-entity, and thus remanded the case to be evaluated on the merits of the
Sherman Act claim. 119
Because of the antitrust exemption, MLB currently has no need to attempt
to defend an antitrust violation using the single-entity defense. Therefore, the
specific reasons for the Supreme Court’s refusal in the American Needle case
to characterize the NFL as a single-entity in the licensing and marketing of
intellectual property are not particularly relevant to MLB. Notwithstanding
this fact and the ultimate failure of the NFL’s justifications in support of its
single-entity defense, those same justifications could play an integral role in a
future challenge to MLB’s antitrust exemption in the licensing and
promotional context. To fully comprehend this alternative use for the NFL’s
single-entity defense, justifications for retention of MLB’s exemption in other
contexts should be examined.
IV. MLB LICENSING AND THE ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
Although the existence and scope of MLB’s exemption have been
challenged in a variety of contexts, it has not yet been directly at issue in any
judicial challenge to an exclusive licensing agreement. To be clear, MLB
licensing arrangements have previously been the subject of an antitrust suit. 120
Notably, though, the MLB exemption itself has not been at issue because
MLB successfully defended the suit under a rule of reason analysis rather than
defending it based on its exemption from the purview of the antitrust laws. 121
Some attorneys and commentators opined that Upper Deck might respond
to the trademark infringement suit filed against it by bringing an antitrust suit
against MLB with the possibility that MLB’s exemption would be at issue. 122
In light of the Supreme Court’s refusal in American Needle to award the NFL
with single-entity status and its concomitant protection from antitrust liability,
some believed that courts might also be willing to narrow the scope of or
remove MLB’s broad antitrust exemption if it was similarly challenged in the
licensing context. 123

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 2208 (citation omitted).
Id. at 2212–17.
See generally Salvino, 542 F.3d 290.
See generally id.
See Hylton, supra note 8; see also Straquadine, supra note 8.
See Hylton, supra note 8; see also Straquadine, supra note 8.
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The Upper Deck licensing situation is MLB’s version of American
Needle. 124 Similar to the centralized licensing functions of NFLP, MLBP
serves as “the exclusive worldwide agent for licensing the use of all names,
logos, trademarks, . . . and other intellectual property owned or controlled by
the MLB Clubs, MLB’s Office of the Commissioner . . . and MLBP . . . on
retail products.” 125 Much like NFLP with regard to the headwear at issue in
American Needle, MLBP generally granted nonexclusive licenses for the use
of its logos and other marks on baseball cards. 126 However, in 2009, MLBP
entered into an exclusive agreement with Topps, a baseball card company,
granting the company exclusive rights to the use of MLB trademarks on
baseball cards. 127 Therefore, Upper Deck, Topps’ long-time competitor and
former MLBP licensee, was no longer able to legally use these marks. 128
Subsequently, Upper Deck produced cards with clearly visible MLB logos on
the players’ uniforms that resulted in a trademark infringement suit filed by
MLBP and a subsequent consent judgment in favor of MLBP. 129
Notwithstanding the arguably favorable holding in American Needle, had
Upper Deck brought an antitrust challenge, or if a similar challenge in the
licensing and intellectual property context were to arise, the existence of
MLB’s exemption would more than likely remain unchanged. Instead, as
evidenced by the numerous aforementioned challenges to MLB’s exemption,
it would be the scope of the exemption that would be at issue. 130 Both the
history of the exemption and the importance of intellectual property to the
existence of MLB as an entertainment product support the notion that MLBP’s
licensing and promotional activities would fall well within the scope of the
exemption.
A. Retention of the MLB Antitrust Exemption
Although the scope of the exemption should be the focus, an overview of
the arguments proffered in support of the exemption’s existence helps provide
context for an analysis of the exemption in the modern era. The court in
Piazza attempted to undermine the stare decisis argument. 131 Notwithstanding
this fact, an argument in support of the exemption must necessarily start with
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

McCann, supra note 107, at 772.
Salvino, 542 F.3d at 294.
See Singer, supra note 4.
Id.
The Upper Deck Co., No.10 Civ. 732, at *4–5.
See generally id.
See e.g., Finley, 569 F.2d 527.
Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 437–38.
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stare decisis because of the long history of the exemption and the stare decisisbased reasoning in Toolson and Flood. 132 It is no small fact that the
exemption has been consistently reaffirmed, and 2012 will mark the ninetieth
year of the MLB antitrust exemption’s existence. 133 Those not in favor of
MLB’s exemption could potentially turn to Leegin Creative Leather Products,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 134 a recent case where the Supreme Court strayed from the
stare decisis principle in the antitrust arena in overturning Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., a decision that had been upheld for almost
100 years. 135 In overturning Dr. Miles Medical, the Court ruled that the
reasons upon which Dr. Miles Medical originally relied no longer existed. 136
Similarly, MLB’s exemption originally rested on the idea that MLB was not
engaged in interstate commerce, but the Court has since recognized that this
reason for the exemption no longer exists because MLB is now clearly
engaged in interstate commerce. 137
Even though it is true that the Court overturned Dr. Miles Medical,
important distinctions exist between the Dr. Miles Medical situation and the
MLB antitrust exemption. Unlike the decision in Leegin, which relaxed the
standard of review used in the vertical price fixing context, 138 the removal of
MLB’s exemption would subject MLB to more antitrust liability rather than
less, and it remains unclear as to whether removal of the exemption would
actually promote any of the interests the antitrust laws exist to protect.139
More importantly, the Court has explicitly expressed a desire to leave it to
Congress to remove MLB’s exemption if it so chooses. 140
Additional arguments in support of the exemption’s continued existence
specifically relate to franchise issues and protection of the Minor League
system. The key notion is that as a result of the antitrust exemption, MLB has
structured itself in a certain way and removal of the exemption would

132. See generally Toolson, 346 U.S. 356; Flood, 407 U.S. 258.
133. See generally Fed. Baseball Club, 259 U.S. 200; see also Toolson, 346 U.S. 356; Flood,
407 U.S. 258.
134. See generally 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
135. See generally Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911),
overruled by Leegin, 551 U.S. 877.
136. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 889.
137. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
138. See generally Leegin, 551 U.S. at 877.
139. See generally Andrew E. Borteck, Note, The Faux Fix: Why a Repeal of Major League
Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption Would Not Solve its Severe Competitive Balance Problems, 25
CARDOZO L. REV. 1069 (2004); see also Clark C. Griffith, BACKTALK: Good Reason for Baseball’s
Antitrust Exemption, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1993, § 8, at 9.
140. See e.g., Flood, 407 U.S. 258.

PADOVE (DO NOT DELETE)

12/21/2011 2:04 PM

2011] UPPER DECK AND MLB’S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION 251
fundamentally alter the game as we know it. Regarding franchise location and
ownership issues, the basic argument is that “[i]f MLB were to lose its
antitrust exemption, it could no longer prevent teams from moving to more
lucrative markets that happen to be claimed by another team.” 141 Eventually,
it would no longer be profitable for a large market city to add another team. 142
This could lead to the elimination of some franchises, a decrease in quality of
play, and a decrease in the cultural significance of the game. 143
Critics often claim that other professional sports leagues function just fine
without an antitrust exemption, but this argument is weakened because of
baseball’s unique Minor League system. 144 The current Minor League reserve
system incentivizes Major League clubs to subsidize the Minor League clubs
and player development and can exist in its current form only because of the
antitrust exemption. 145 Without these subsidies, there would be “severe
economic hardships for many minor league clubs,” which would eventually
affect both the Minor and Major League structures. 146 If the exemption was
removed, some Minor League clubs would be able to survive and even thrive
without the Major League, but this would certainly not be the case for a
substantial amount of these teams, thus resulting in the elimination of some
Minor League clubs that are so vital to, and beloved by, many small
communities throughout the country. 147
Indeed, the arguments in favor of the retention of the MLB exemption are
strong, regardless of the many counterarguments that can be made. However,
the existence of the exemption does not cut at the heart of the modern issues
regarding MLB’s exemption. Today, the real issue is the nature and extent of
the scope of the exemption.

141. Bruce Johnson, Why Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption Must Go, in STEE-RIKE FOUR!
WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE BUSINESS OF BASEBALL? 140 (Daniel R. Marburger ed., 1997).
142. See Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility and Tax Policy, 95 MINN.
L. REV. 904, 915–17 (2011); see also William F. Shughart II, Preserve Baseball’s Antitrust
Exemption, or, Why the Senators Are out of Their League, in STEE-RIKE FOUR! WHAT’S WRONG
WITH THE BUSINESS OF BASEBALL? 143 (Daniel R. Marburger ed., 1997); Borteck, supra note 139,
at 1109.
143. See Shughart, supra note 142, at 153–54; see also JEROLD J. DUQUETTE, REGULATING THE
NATIONAL PASTIME: BASEBALL AND ANTITRUST 16 (1999); Griffith, supra note 139.
144. See Stanley M. Brand & Andrew J. Giorgione, The Effect of Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption
and Contraction on its Minor League Baseball System: A Case Study of the Harrisburg Senators, 10
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 49, 58–60 (2003).
145. DUQUETTE, supra note 143, at 122; see also Brand & Giorgione, supra note 144, at 50–52.
146. DUQUETTE, supra note 143, at 122; see also Brand & Giorgione, supra note 144, at 50–52.
147. DUQUETTE, supra note 143, at 123.
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B. Intellectual Property Licensing as Exempt from the Sherman Act
Although some lower courts have looked to Flood as exemplifying a very
narrow scope of the exemption, limited just to actions involving MLB’s
reserve clause, 148 the explicit language used in the Curt Flood Act, combined
with the overall judicial history regarding the scope of the exemption,
demonstrates that it is proper to characterize the exemption broadly rather than
narrowly. Under this broad characterization, the actions of MLBP regarding
licensing and intellectual property decisions must necessarily be included as
part of the exemption.
As the Court expressed in Flood, any changes regarding the exemption
should be congressional in nature, rather than judicial. 149 The Curt Flood Act
represents the only significant related congressional action and, importantly,
narrowed the exemption only insofar as MLB is now subject to antitrust
scrutiny in the labor arena in the same way other professional sports leagues
are subject to scrutiny regarding employment terms. 150 However, Congress
specifically chose not to narrow the exemption even further than what is
effectively a nominal narrowing due to the statutory and nonstatutory labor
exemptions. In fact, with the specific language used in the Curt Flood Act,
Congress expressed its intention that the exemption should continue to apply
to many components of the business of baseball. 151 Of particular relevance
here, is that the statute explicitly does not apply to MLB’s actions regarding
“the marketing or sales of the entertainment product of organized professional
baseball and the licensing of intellectual property rights owned or held by
organized professional baseball teams individually or collectively” through
MLBP. 152
The standard under the “Baseball Trilogy” is that MLB’s exemption
applies to the entire “business of baseball.” 153 Thus, assuming that the
exemption will continue to exist in some form unless Congress removes it
completely, the key question in any antitrust suit against MLB will necessarily
be whether the challenged action is included as part of the “business of
baseball.” As the court in Henderson Broadcasting expressed, to determine if
a challenged action is included as part of the “business of baseball,” a court
must decide whether the action is a “‘unique characteristic[]’” or “‘need[]’ of

148.
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150.
151.
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See, e.g., Piazza, 831 F. Supp. 420.
Flood, 407 U.S. at 283–84.
See MITTEN, supra note 12, at 436–80.
See 15 U.S.C. § 26b(b)(1)–(3).
Id. § 26b(b)(3).
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the game.” 154 It is here that the previously articulated NFL arguments in
support of the single-entity defense in American Needle become relevant to
MLB. Although the NFL’s arguments eventually failed as justifications for
status as a single-entity, MLB need not attempt to categorize MLBP as a
single-entity because it benefits from the exemption. Rather, the NFL’s failed
justifications precisely relate to why marketing, licensing, and promotion of
MLB’s intellectual property most certainly falls within the “business of
baseball.”
Just like the NFL urged that “[t]he intellectual property of the NFL and its
member clubs . . . is an integral part of NFL Football,” 155 so, too, is the
intellectual property of MLB an integral part of the MLB product. Identical to
reasoning expressed in the NFL’s brief in support of its single-entity defense,
the production of MLB requires “the collective deployment” of intellectual
property featured on the field such as “clubs’ names, the logos that adorn the
players’ uniforms, the uniform designs, and each club’s official colors.” 156 As
expressed in Flood, baseball is a business. 157 In addition to the use of
intellectual property on the field specifically, the business of MLB as a whole
is the “production and promotion of [teams’] joint entertainment product,” 158
which necessarily involves the licensing and marketing of intellectual property
so as to better compete against other entertainment products as a business
concerned with profits and losses.
The entertainment value is directly related to continued fan interest in the
league, which, in turn, directly affects a league’s profits, losses, and revenues.
Continued fan interest in MLB and other professional sports is attributed to the
uncertain outcome inherent in athletic competitions, a characteristic distinct
from other forms of entertainment. 159 In recognition of the importance of an
uncertain outcome, professional sports leagues employ a variety of tactics to
maintain and increase the competitive balance in their respective leagues in an
attempt to ensure that small market teams have a reasonable opportunity to
compete with large market teams such that this uncertain outcome is not
lost. 160 For instance, both the NFL and MLB “engage in extensive revenue
and cost sharing . . . in an effort to enhance the ability of their product to
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Henderson Broad., 541 F. Supp. at 271.
Brief for Appellee-Respondent, supra note 112, at **14.
See id. at **15.
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compete against other forms of entertainment.” 161 Because this competitive
balance is necessary to ensure an uncertain outcome, it follows that the
licensing and promotion of MLB’s intellectual property through MLBP is also
a need of the game.
Revenues generated by MLBP through its licensing agreements represent
a portion of shared revenues and, thus, contribute to the pool of money
distributed to all MLB teams to achieve the necessary competitive balance to
enhance the entertainment value of the MLB product. 162 In Henderson
Broadcasting, the court held that broadcasting of MLB games was not part of
the “business of baseball” as a unique characteristic or need of the game
because it was an entirely “distinct and separate industry.” 163 This decision
simply does not hold true when it comes to actions of MLBP in licensing and
promoting intellectual property, especially given the wide use of MLB
intellectual property on the field as part of team logos and colors. Similarly,
the court in Postema held that the challenged actions were not unique
characteristics or needs of the game because they “in no way enhance[d] its
vitality or viability.” 164 The exact opposite is true of MLB’s intellectual
property. The licensing and promotion of that intellectual property, quite
literally, enhances the viability of MLB at a very minimum because of the
importance of competitive balance and the fact that the MLB clubs share the
revenues of MLBP. Thus, were the exemption directly at issue in an antitrust
challenge to the licensing and promotional activities of MLBP, these activities
should be exempt as part of the “business of baseball.”
V. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the licensing and promotion of MLB’s intellectual
property is a distinct need of the game and is, therefore, included as part of the
“business of baseball.” Thus, it should be exempt from the purview of the
federal antitrust laws.
MLB’s antitrust exemption can be traced back almost ninety years to the
landmark decision in Federal Baseball. Since then, the Supreme Court has
reaffirmed the exemption, and Congress has not yet taken any action to
remove it. Today, the exemption is an anomaly. However, given the Court’s
express intent to leave it to Congress to remove the exemption, and Congress’
explicit language in the Curt Flood Act limiting the statute’s reach, the
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exemption will continue to exist in some form for at least the foreseeable
future. Thus, courts in the modern era are faced with the task of defining the
scope of the exemption.
As previously explained, the issue of the exemption’s scope is more
properly characterized as a determination of how to properly define the
“business of baseball.” Although some lower courts have interpreted Flood to
limit the scope of the exemption under the “business of baseball” to situations
involving MLB’s reserve clause, the “great weight” of authority recognizes
that the exemption applies to the “business of baseball” as a whole. 165 Upper
Deck did not file an antitrust suit against MLB, but there will surely be another
licensing situation in the future that might give rise to a challenge to MLB’s
antitrust exemption. There is no way of knowing for sure just how a court
would rule on this issue because the exemption has not been an issue in such a
context. However, MLB can employ the NFL’s single-entity arguments from
the American Needle case to demonstrate that intellectual property is part of
the “business of baseball” as a vital need of the game. As such, the licensing
and promotion of MLB and its member clubs through MLBP is integral to the
production of MLB and should be exempt from the purview of the federal
antitrust laws.
Sarah A. Padove

165. See McCoy, 911 F. Supp. at 457.

